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Abstract: In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution 
from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal 
self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological 
givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they 
might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to conscious-
ness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a 
comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial. 
The target papers of this special issue make a variety of interesting 
claims about the nature of consciousness and self. A persistent theme 
in many of these contributions is the description of various ‘selfless’ 
states: modes of experience in which one’s sense of selfhood erodes or 
disappears entirely, and one is left with bare consciousness and a 
unifying sense that ‘all is one’. While phenomenologically intriguing, 
these descriptions can be somewhat difficult to parse for those of us 
who’ve not personally realized these experiences. Nevertheless, they 
are important to consider for a number of reasons — including the 
different ways they appear to challenge some taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the nature of consciousness and self. 
In this commentary, we engage primarily with Almaas’s contribu-
tion. We attempt to clarify what we take his claims about selfless 
experience to amount to, exactly, and then — working from within the 
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phenomenological tradition — we attempt to show how his 
descriptions of selfless experience and ‘pure consciousness’ might be 
reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and 
self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a compara-
tive analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial. 
Phenomenological Perspectives 
on Consciousness and Self 
Almaas develops a rich phenomenologically-orientated investigation 
of the relation between consciousness and the self. He appears to have 
two primary objectives, one ontological and one methodological. His 
first objective is to defend a kind of deflationary realism about the 
self, in other words that the self doesn’t really exist. As we understand 
it, his view is that while a persistent sense of self at the core of con-
scious experience is indeed very real — his analysis of what he terms 
‘phenomenological givens of all experience’ (p. 14) is meant to eluci-
date the structural features of consciousness that generate this per-
sistent sense of self — we are nevertheless misled when we reify this 
sense of self and infer back to the necessary existence of fixed, 
enduring, or substantial self somehow distinct from this sense of self. 
His second objective is to argue that experiential insights uncovered 
in various contemplative traditions — such as those gained from his 
own tradition, the Diamond Approach — challenge models of con-
sciousness and self found in the phenomenological tradition. This is 
because certain forms of illuminative experience appear to involve 
states that cannot be adequately accounted for within the categories 
and descriptions characteristic of phenomenological approaches, and 
therefore suggest the need to adopt a broader and more inclusive 
method for describing the structure of consciousness, self, and 
experience. His analysis of concepts like ‘individual consciousness’, 
‘pure consciousness’, and the ‘reflexivity’ of consciousness is meant 
to accomplish this task. 
In what follows, we evaluate these two objectives in turn. While we 
are sympathetic to his first objective, we find his second objective 
promising, but also somewhat puzzling. We attempt to make explicit 
some implicit arguments Almaas offers in support of his deflationary 
realism about the self. Additionally, we try to bring some conceptual 
clarity and critical discussion to Almaas’s critique of phenomeno-
logical approaches to consciousness. 
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The narrative self 
As Almaas notes, one of the reasons we are driven to reify the self is 
because many of us have a deep-rooted sense that we are — or indeed 
must be — entities who persist over time. Whatever its nature, the self 
is thought to be something defined by its past and future. And one 
popular way to think about the temporal nature of the self in 
philosophy and other disciplines, as Almaas notes, is to see it as a 
narrative construction.1 From this perspective, the self emerges within, 
and is ultimately sustained by, the ongoing activity of telling stories. 
Some of these stories we tell ourselves; others we inherit or appro-
priate from elsewhere. Whatever their source, our self-narratives are 
the tools by which we make sense of our actions and experiences, and 
solidify and negotiate our relationships with others. As Marya 
Schechtman puts it, ‘we constitute ourselves as persons… by 
developing and operating with a (mostly implicit) autobiographical 
narrative which acts as the lens through which we experience the 
world’ (Schechtman, 2014, p. 100). 
The narrative approach gains force when we consider the ubiquity 
of storytelling in our lives. Consider the act of waking up in the 
morning. As soon as we’re relatively lucid, most of us will 
immediately begin planning and thinking through our day. We project 
ourselves into future scenarios: we think about things to do before 
getting the kids out the door for school, and last-minute preparations 
we need to make before an important meeting later that morning; we 
may also make a mental note to call a sibling later and wish them a 
happy birthday, or imagine how satisfying it will be to try a newly-
acquired single malt whiskey after work. We also remember the past: 
we might grimace while reliving a callous remark uttered to our 
spouse in a heated moment during last night’s dinner, feel remorse at 
the hurt it caused, and vow to apologize and not repeat this practice in 
the future. This capacity for ‘self-projection’, the ability to prospect-
ively inhabit an imagined future and summon a remembered personal 
past, are central mental capacities enabling us to think of ourselves as 
selves who persist though time, living out a personal narrative in 
which we are the principle player (Thompson, 2014, p. 348; see also 
Buckner and Carroll, 2007). When we exercise these capacities and 
                                                          
1  See Schechtman (2011) for a more nuanced introduction to the narrative self than we 
can offer here. 
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reflect on our experiences, traits, actions, and dispositions, we enact a 
narratively structured self. 
A narrative approach is compelling because it seems to capture both 
the temporal and social dimensions of the self (Gallagher and Zahavi, 
2008, p. 201). We’ve seen how our narratively-mediated capacity for 
self-projection establishes the former. When we describe something 
we did several weeks ago, we make a claim on that experience; we 
mark our present self as both the author and owner of that past action 
and, in so doing, incorporate it into our narrative identity. But our 
stories don’t occur in a social vacuum. We share them with others. 
And we do so by participating in a community that existed before we 
came into being. When we participate in this community by weaving a 
self-narrative, we rely on conventions and practices established by 
others; the form our self-narratives take reflect the values, ideals, and 
aspirations of the sociocultural context in which they unfold 
(Flanagan, 1993, p. 206). And we often modify our narrative practices 
in real-time by responding to stories that others (parents, siblings, 
friends, romantic partners, children, etc.) tell about us. 
Narrative approaches to the self have enjoyed increased popularity 
in a number of disciplines in recent years, including both philosophy 
and psychology.2 But is a narrative approach sufficient to establish the 
existence of a persistent or substantial self? As Almaas notes (pp. 24–
6), to evaluate this question requires first clarifying the strength of the 
narrative thesis being asserted. There are at least two options here. On 
the one hand, one might defend a weaker form of the narrative thesis, 
what Krueger (2011) calls the ‘Narrative Enhancement Account’ 
(NEA). According to NEA, our narrative practices are an important 
part of everyday life. But narratives don’t actually constitute the self; 
rather, they simply enhance or enrich a previously-existing pre-
narrative self. For example, it may be that some aspects of our self-
understanding (e.g. features of our cultural or ethnic identity, gender 
representations, etc.) only emerge when we engage with and appro-
priate different narratives. But NEA need not be committed to the 
claim that narratives exhaust the ontological reality of the self. 
A stronger and more philosophically substantive thesis is the 
‘Narrative Constitution Account’ (NCA). For NCA, the self is an 
                                                          
2  See, for example, Bruner (1987), Dennett (1991), Donald (2002), MacIntyre (1981), 
Nelson (2003), Taylor (1989), Ricouer (1992), Rudd (2009), Schechtman (1996; 2014), 
and Velleman (2006). 
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inherently narrative entity. It is constituted by the stories it tells about 
itself and others tell about it. Dennett, for instance, endorses this kind 
of narrative constitution claim. He tells us that ‘[o]ur tales are spun, 
but for the most part we don’t spin them; they spin us. Our human 
consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not their 
source’ (Dennett, 1991, p. 418). And while her narrative account of 
self is more nuanced than Dennett’s, Schechtman’s ‘self-constitution’ 
view appears to endorse a similar claim when she writes that, ‘[a]n 
individual constitutes herself as a person by coming to organize her 
experiences in a narrative self-conception of the appropriate form’ 
(Schechtman, 1996, p. 134). Similarly, the cognitive psychologist 
Jerome Bruner tells us that, ‘In the end, we become the auto-
biographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Bruner, 
1987, p. 15). 
However, as Almaas observes, there is a straightforward but power-
ful objection to NCA. In order to construct a narrative self, one must 
already be a subject of experience, that is, a subject capable of having 
— and also caring about and reflecting on — experiences that provide 
content for the narratives we construct about that content (Krueger, 
2011, pp. 37–43; see also Menary, 2008; Zahavi, 2007). We only 
construct narratives about our experiences if we’re the sort of creature 
capable of having experiences in the first place. And this capacity to 
have experiences, and potentially (although not necessarily) subject 
them to narrative scrutiny, requires the presence of a first-person 
perspective, a conscious subject. Narrative selves thus presuppose the 
prior existence of experiential selves — conscious subjects phenom-
enologically and ontologically more basic than our self-reflexive 
narrative practices. Narrative selves are thus derivative; they rest on a 
more fundamental form of selfhood and, accordingly, cannot be said 
to constitute the self. Additionally — and more pertinent to Almaas’s 
analysis — narrativity alone is insufficient to establish the existence of 
a persistent or unchanging self since there is reason to think that some 
sort experiential self remains in cases where the narrative self is pro-
foundly compromised or missing altogether. 
Although Almaas is mainly concerned with experiential insights 
gained from different contemplative practices, this objection gains 
additional support from a number of other sources. For example, 
Jerome Bruner observes that a neurological disorder called 
dysnnarativia — a severe impairment in the ability to tell or under-
stand stories associated with neuropathies like Korsakov’s syndrome 
or Alzheimer’s disease — leads to a condition in which ‘selfhood 
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virtually vanishes’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 86). Without the ability to reflect 
on their past and anticipate a future they inhabit, individuals suffering 
from dysnnarativia lack the basic tools needed to construct the sense 
of being a self that endures through time (Young and Saver, 2001). 
Something similar has been observed in schizophrenic patients, some 
of whom exhibit great difficulty in planning and initiating action, 
keeping track of the sequence of events, and placing themselves in 
time (Gallagher, 2007). However, while dysnnarativia clearly has 
catastrophic consequences for our ability to develop the kind of self 
that emerges from and is structured by our narrative practices, it’s less 
clear (pace Bruner) that the ability to form a sense of self at all has 
completely gone missing in these cases. 
Consider Antonio Damasio’s (1999) discussion of ‘David’. Due to a 
severe case of encephalitis that resulted in major damage to his left 
and right temporal lobe, David lost both the ability to retain any new 
facts as well as recall any facts about his personal history (ibid., p. 
115). In virtue of this dramatic memory loss, David lives in the 
immediate now — or, more precisely, a continually-shifting window 
of about forty-five seconds — and is, accordingly, incapable of con-
structing a narrative self. However, in Damasio’s terminology, David 
still retains ‘core consciousness’: a primitive moment-to-moment 
sense of being a minimal experiential self (ibid., p. 16). David is 
awake and alert, responds to others and things happening around him, 
experiences emotions, engages in intentional goal-directed actions, 
and articulates various preferences. Despite his inability to construct a 
narrative self, David still retains a basic pre-reflective awareness that 
the experiences he undergoes are his; he is immediately aware of 
himself as a locus of consciousness and agency. 
Oliver Sacks (2007) recounts the similarly dramatic case of Clive 
Wearing, a well-respected musician and musicologist who suffered a 
brain infection in his mid-forties that, like David, left him with 
devastating anterograde and retrograde amnesia. Unlike David, how-
ever, Clive perpetually inhabits an even shorter ‘now’ confined to a 
mere few seconds. His wife, Deborah, tells us that, following Clive’s 
infection, ‘[h]is ability to perceive what he saw and heard was 
unimpaired. But he did not seem to be able to retain any impression of 
anything for more than a blink. Indeed, if he did blink, his eyelids 
parted to reveal a new scene. The view before the blink was utterly 
forgotten’ (quoted in Sacks, 2007, p. 188). Like David, Clive lacks the 
resources to construct a narrative self. But, also like David, Clive 
nevertheless retains a minimal sense of experiential selfhood anchored 
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in an immediate, pre-reflective awareness of his own conscious 
episodes as his. This minimal self-awareness is clear from the tragic 
journal entries following his infection: ‘2.10pm: this time properly 
awake… 2:14pm: this time finally awake… 2.35pm: this time com-
pletely awake’; ‘I was fully conscious at 10.35pm, and awake for the 
first time in many, many weeks’ (quoted in Sacks, 2007, p. 189). 
The takeaway point of these observations is that they appear to 
affirm Almaas’s claim that appealing to narrativity is insufficient to 
establish the existence of a persistent or substantial self. We are 
misled when we reify the sense of self established and maintained 
within our narrative practices. Narrative selves depend, both 
phenomenologically and ontologically, on the primacy of a minimal 
experiential self; the latter provides the conditions of possibility for 
the former.3 Narrative self-reflexivity thus involves what, as we’ll see 
below, appears to be a more fundamental experiential self-reflexivity. 
This latter feature of consciousness receives the bulk of Almaas’s 
attention — and it places his analysis in-step with phenomenological 
approaches to consciousness — so we turn to a consideration of this 
notion now. 
Self-reflexivity and the minimal self 
The discussion in the previous section indicated that looking at narra-
tive self-reflexivity is insufficient to discern a permanent self. Almaas 
is aware of this, and therefore spends much of his discussion unpack-
ing the phenomenological structure of a more primitive form of pre-
narrative self-reflexivity. This focus puts Almaas in a direct dialogue 
with phenomenological treatments of consciousness and self. For 
phenomenologists, the self is not first and foremost a narrative con-
struction but rather an experiential dimension, a core feature central to 
the very structure of consciousness. To be a creature capable of 
experience is to possess a first-person perspective on the world. From 
a phenomenological perspective, this first-person perspective is a 
‘minimal’ phenomenal self (Zahavi, 2005).4 Within the phenomeno-
                                                          
3  See Krueger (2011, pp. 41–3) for some possible narrative responses to this objection. 
See also Schechtman (2011, pp. 407–11). Strawson (2004) offers additional arguments 
against the narrative self, both as a descriptive claim as well as a normative ideal. 
4  The minimal self refers to more than just the first-person perspective (for instance 
intentionality and an internal time consciousness). The first-person perspective, how-
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logical tradition, arguments for a minimal self generally stem from the 
intuition that ‘even if all of the unessential features of self are stripped 
away… there is still some basic, immediate, or primitive “something” 
that we are willing to call a self’ (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15). Addition-
ally, developmental studies of neonate imitation (e.g. Melztoff and 
Moore, 1989; Nagy et al., 2007),5 as well as work on motor repre-
sentations and agency (e.g. Legrand et al., 2007) and self-disorders in 
schizophrenia (e.g. Sass and Parnas, 2003) are some of the streams of 
empirical work summoned to further motivate the idea of the minimal 
self. 
As we saw both with Damasio’s David as well as with Clive 
Wearing, losing one’s narrative capacities and sense of historicity 
doesn’t simultaneously entail a loss of one’s subjectivity. Both David 
and Clive remain aware that their moment-to-moment synchronic 
experiences are their own, even if they lack diachronic awareness of 
themselves as temporally-extended narrative selves. From a 
phenomenological perspective, this is because conscious states are 
characterized by their inherent self-referentiality or ipseity (from the 
Latin ipse, meaning ‘himself’ or ‘herself’). The notion of ipseity is 
meant to capture the sense of coinciding with one’s experience at a 
given moment: that is, the tacit feel of owning one’s experiences as 
one lives through them. This tacit sense of ownership, which 
phenomenologists insist is an invariant structural feature of conscious-
ness, is subjectivity revealing itself to itself in the act of conscious-
ness. As Michel Henry puts it, ‘The interiority of the immediate 
presence to itself constitutes the essence of ipseity’ (Henry, 1975, p. 
38). 
When I feel a twinge in my lower back, say, lift my arm to scratch 
my nose, or bite into and savour a particularly juicy peach, I don’t 
have to first reflect on the experience in order to then ascertain that 
it’s mine. Rather, all of these experiences are immediately felt as such. 
I pre-reflectively experience them as my own. Unlike the narrative 
self, then, the minimal self is, according to this line of thought, not 
something constructed over time. Rather, it is built into the very 
structure of consciousness. For phenomenologists, the significance of 
this subtle ‘minimal’ form of experiential selfhood is that it must be 
                                                                                                                  
ever, is at the core. In this commentary, we operate with the minimal self as essentially 
identical to the first-person perspective. 
5  Although see Jones (2009) for a critical look at neonate imitation studies. 
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central to any consideration of consciousness. As Sartre puts it, ‘pre-
reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same notion of 
self which must be studied, for it defines the very being of conscious-
ness’ (Sartre, 1956, p. 123). 
We find a cluster of similar ideas within the Buddhist tradition.6 
Buddhist thinkers such as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita, for 
instance, speak of the self-reflexive character of consciousness with 
their notion of svasaṃvedana (self-awareness), which appears to be 
very close to what phenomenologists mean when they speak of ipseity 
and pre-reflective self-awareness. Dignāga, for example, argues that 
‘Every cognition is produced within a two-fold appearance, namely 
that of itself (svābhāsa) and that of the object (viṣayābhāsa)’ (Dignāga 
and Hattori, 1968, p. 28). The idea — again, anticipating phenomenol-
ogical insights — is that every act of consciousness has a dual-aspect, 
Janus-faced structure. When I am aware, say, of the car rumbling 
down the street outside, I am simultaneously aware, in that single 
experience, both of the object-as-given (i.e. the sound of the car) as 
well as my experience of the object-as-given (i.e. the auditory experi-
ence of the car as my experience). Conscious states thus disclose or 
‘illuminate’ both their features of the world as well as features of the 
first-person perspective experiencing the world (Coseru, 2009). They 
are intrinsically self-reflexive. 
On the face of it, this phenomenological model of a minimal experi-
ential self would seem to present a challenge for Buddhism, Almaas, 
and other contributors to this volume who claim that experiences in a 
mode of genuine selflessness are possible. For, if the minimal self is, 
as phenomenologists claim, a necessary and invariant structural 
feature of consciousness — and experiences of selflessness (whatever 
these experiences amount to, exactly) are indeed possible — they 
would seem to entail the presence of a minimal self having the experi-
ence. Unlike the narrative self, which we saw previously is relatively 
‘disposable’, a minimal experiential self appears, at least from a 
phenomenological perspective, to be a necessary feature of any con-
scious episode.7 Yet Almaas and other contributors speak freely of 
various kinds of experiences that purportedly occur in a mode of 
                                                          
6  See Dreyfus (2011) and MacKenzie (2008) for further discussion. 
7  Although it is not at all clear that embracing something akin to a ‘minimal self’ entails 
committing oneself to the idea of a permanent or enduring self. See Krueger (2011) for 
further discussion than is possible here. 
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genuine selflessness. Careful phenomenological analysis of what these 
different claims amount to is thus needed. With these phenomenol-
ogical concepts in place, we turn to that task now. 
Consciousness and Self in Almaas 
The enlightened experience in all the target texts involves a falling 
away of ego or self. Put in simple terms, it is the experience that ‘all is 
one’. Such an experience runs counter to the phenomenological con-
tours we have drawn above. If everything is truly one, there can be no 
distinct first-person perspective on the world, no individual self-
consciousness (i.e. ‘minimal self’) apart from the things and events 
experiences are experiences of. In several of the target papers, we find 
the position that the self is something associated with, or constructed 
by, craving; this craving is a kind of suffering, an excessive focus on 
the self and its desires, which is overcome or transcended through 
spiritual practice. This transcendence, taking different forms in the 
different target papers, can purportedly lead to a complete annihilation 
of the first-person perspective, conceived of as a structural feature of 
individual consciousness. We are told, for example, that beyond the 
self we can see ‘from the eyes of eternity… [or] the eyes of God’ 
(Adyashanti, p. 44); we have an experiential realization that there ‘is 
no separation of one thing from another’ (Almaas, p. 21), and that ‘we 
are all and everything, which is a non-numerical oneness’ (ibid., p. 
21). These are striking claims. Initially, it seems there is little hope for 
any conceptual reconciliation between phenomenology and the forms 
of spirituality that subscribe to the ‘all is one’ idea. However, another 
look at Almaas’s text, in particular, seems to offer a way out — a 
middle ground in which the central claims of the two traditions seem 
to be closer than might initially appear. In order to show this, we will 
first discuss a couple of key passages and then relate them back to the 
phenomenological analysis of consciousness and self introduced 
above. 
Almaas’s text is structured around the seeming tension as just 
presented. Again, the tension is this: on the one hand we have an 
enlightened, purportedly non-dual experience whose distinctive 
feature is that it is a mode of experience without a (minimal) self; on 
the other, we also have ‘phenomenological givens’, such as a primi-
tive self-recognition, that structure all experience — even enlightened, 
purportedly non-dual experiences. And, as we saw in the previous 
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section, these phenomenological givens arguably constitute a minimal 
phenomenal self. In his abstract Almaas writes: 
This paper addresses the phenomenological givens of all experience: 
first-personal givenness, reflexivity of consciousness, and unity of 
experience in space and time. The discussion so far has focused on pure 
consciousness, the ground of being in many Eastern spiritual teachings, 
and the illusion of an individual self. I contend that this does not fully 
account for these phenomenological givens and propose an individual 
consciousness through which pure consciousness expresses itself. 
(Almaas, p. 14) 
To see how this tension might be resolved, let us first give a brief 
description of these two dimensions, the ‘phenomenological givens’ 
and ‘pure consciousness’, and then consider how Almaas relates them 
to one another. 
Almaas on the ‘phenomenological givens’ 
In developing his notion of ‘phenomenological givens’, Almaas tells 
us: 
You have your stream of experience, and I have mine. Your stream of 
experience might be of non-dual realization of satchitananda and mine 
might be of non-dual empty awareness, but obviously there are two, and 
they are different. Such observation indicates that first-personal given-
ness persists even in non-dual experience, for it is not constructed. 
(ibid., p. 21) 
This is a helpful clarification. For, it appears that no matter how 
genuinely non-dual an enlightened experience might be, for Almaas, if 
two people are simultaneously having it, then they belong to two 
different streams of consciousness. A subject will not mistake her 
non-dual experience as somehow given to another. Echoing 
phenomenology approaches, Almaas takes first-personal givenness to 
be an essential structural feature of consciousness. 
So what exactly does he mean by ‘first-personal givenness’? 
Arguably the same thing phenomenologists mean: namely, the sub-
jectivity or ipseity of experience, i.e. the minimal self. This is clear 
because Almaas explicitly appropriates Zahavi’s view of first-personal 
givenness. In developing his analysis of ‘phenomenological givens’, 
Almaas relies heavily on Zahavi’s contribution to the 2011, Self, No 
Self? volume. Once again, however, maintaining the ubiquity of the 
first-person perspective does not entail holding that an entity, a self, or 
a subject owns or is separate from the stream of experience. Rather, it 
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means that consciousness is structured such that it is self-presenting or 
self-given — that is, phenomenally manifest to a first-person 
perspective. 
As his second ‘phenomenological given’, Almaas mentions self-
presentation or self-givenness as ‘the reflexivity of experience’. He 
writes: ‘You do not simply see an apple; you are always aware that 
you are seeing an apple’ (p. 16). We have mentioned this under the 
term that consciousness is ‘Janus-faced’, that whenever an object is 
present, it is always given as ‘present-for’ or ‘present-to’. The mani-
fested object always includes and refers back to its dative ‘for me’. 
Almaas presents different varieties of reflexivity of experience, but for 
the purposes of the present discussion we want to simply emphasize a 
reading in which the reflexivity of experience, as Janus-faced, is 
equivalent to saying that consciousness is always manifest to a first-
person perspective. 
Finally, Almaas holds that experience is phenomenally given as 
both synchronically and diachronically unified. Firstly, according to 
Almaas, ‘Synchronic unity is the fact that at any moment all the 
elements of our experience are known to be our experience. They are 
unified as belonging to the same consciousness’ (ibid., p. 16). For 
Almaas, it appears that synchronic unity, reflexivity of experience, 
and first-personal givenness together constitute the ipseity of 
consciousness.8 
To sum up, Almaas holds these three features of consciousness — 
first-personal givenness, reflexivity of experience, and dia/synchronic 
unity of experience — to be phenomenological givens that can be 
found in all experience.9 In this regard, Almaas’s characterization 
appears to be consistent with a phenomenological approach to con-
sciousness and the minimal self. But Almaas also claims (representing 
the Diamond Approach) that the non-dual, enlightened experience is 
characterized by ‘no separation of one thing from another’ (ibid., p. 
21), or that ‘we are all and everything, which is a non-numerical one-
ness’ (ibid.). Let us give a slightly more detailed characterization 
before then analysing how these two perspectives are to be integrated. 
                                                          
8  It would be interesting to address Almaas’s rich understanding of time and presence vis-
à-vis Husserl’s work on ‘internal time consciousness’. Such a discussion, however, is 
tangential to the present commentary. 
9  We are not sure if Almaas holds that these three exclusively are phenomenological 
givens or whether there might be more. 
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Almaas on pure consciousness 
For Almaas, the realm of pure consciousness is reached through 
‘spiritual practice and contemplation’, which is 
basically a divesting of the individual consciousness of its stories, 
structures, concepts, and ideas of itself and reality. Such baring reveals 
the individual consciousness in its purity as a clear medium of con-
sciousness, totally transparent and capable of immediate experience of 
its nature. (ibid., pp. 26–7) 
While this is a suggestive formulation, we want to emphasize that the 
realm of pure consciousness, described thusly, is somewhat difficult to 
understand and analyse. We can start to get a grip on this idea by 
noting that there are parts of this description that resonate with themes 
discussed earlier. For instance, when Almaas speaks of pure con-
sciousness as ‘divesting individual consciousness of its stories’, this 
strikes us as an attempt to isolate a pre-narrative mode of experience 
similar to the sorts of experiences discussed above. Almaas looks to 
plumb the depths of elusive pre-narrative experiences that take us 
beyond the narratively structured ‘ideas of itself and reality’ and 
which define our common everyday experience of selfhood: thinking 
of ourselves as persistent subjects distinct from the world and others, 
for example, or defining ourselves according to various social, 
cultural, political, or religious narratives.10 Similarly, phenomenology 
is also aimed at overcoming everyday taken-for-granted conceptions 
of self and reality — in other words, moving beyond the natural 
attitude in order to discern deeper invariant structures of conscious-
ness and the self–world relation. However, if pure consciousness as 
Almaas appears to define it is only achieved by a total stripping away 
of all that we (think we) know, there would seem to be very little 
material for phenomenology to work with.11 
                                                          
10  There is an interesting question of whether the phenomenological method of using the 
epoché and phenomenological reduction has significant similarities to some of the 
spiritual work of the contemplative practices. This question is beyond the scope of the 
current commentary. 
11  There is indeed a pressing question whether pure consciousness or enlightened experi-
ence can be understood conceptually at all, in other words whether it can be understood 
apart from being directly experienced, perhaps as what Almaas calls ‘knowing by 
being’. This question is motivated for instance by Gautama Buddha’s claim that: ‘The 
Law [to which one is enlightened] is not something that can be understood through pon-
dering or analysis. Only those who are Buddhas can understand it’ (in Watson, 1993, p. 
31). In the target papers, we also find Adyashanti speaking to this dimension of 
 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  THE  FIRST-PERSON  PERSPECTIVE  &  BEYOND 171 
As we understand it, the idea seems to be something like the 
following: through spiritual practice, which involves enacting various 
techniques to divest oneself of preconceived conceptions, ideas, narra-
tives, and structures, one may reach a clear, immediate understanding 
of one’s own true nature. This is pure consciousness, a non-dual mode 
of experience in which 
there is no sense of being an individual consciousness. Rather than 
individuality, there is a sense of being the whole, or, more exactly, the 
sense of indeterminate boundaries. (Almaas, p. 27) 
Although there may be differentiation in non-dual experience, there is 
no separation of one thing from another. By recognizing we are the con-
sciousness, we recognize we are everything, for everything is simply 
the manifestation of consciousness. (ibid., p. 21) 
In non-dual experience there is no experienced separation between me 
and the world. Hence, there is no ‘me’ and no ‘world’, ‘no separation 
of one thing from another’, but rather a ‘sense of being the whole’ 
with no determinate boundaries. It seems to follow from this that there 
can be no ‘you’ apart from ‘me’, no objects separate from one another 
or separate from me. It is difficult to grasp what it must be like to 
undergo such an experience because in our ordinary lives we always 
experience the world through a fundamental separation between self 
and world, a division between ‘me’ (i.e. as a first-person perspective, 
or minimal self) and ‘objects out there in the world’.12 Within the 
phenomenological tradition, the notion of ipseity is formulated in part 
to account for this fact. How would we live in a practical world with-
out this fundamental separation between me and objects out there? 
How would I locate my phone and make a call if I cannot separate 
where my body ends and the phone begins? It seems that Almaas’s 
answer to such a question lies in his distinction between ‘differentia-
tion’ and ‘separation’. In non-dual experience, there is differentiation, 
but not separation between me and the world. It is difficult to think of 
a differentiation that is not also a separation in some form. To help 
thinking about this distinction, Almaas uses the metaphor of the ocean 
and its waves. 
                                                                                                                  
consciousness as ‘hard to think of’, ‘paradoxical’, and ‘beyond all imagination’ 
(Adyashanti, pp. 38, 40). 
12  Note that separation does not entail disconnection. For instance, we can only perceive 
others as separate and non-coinciding with ourselves because we are connected to them. 
The phenomenological notion of intentionality is supposed to account for this. 
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They [the forms] are like the waves of the ocean, not separate from the 
ocean. (Almaas, p. 23) 
The idea here seems to be that individual consciousness is like a wave, 
while pure consciousness is the all-embracing ocean. From the per-
spective of a wave — let us call this ordinary, unenlightened, dual 
experience — one wave is separate from the next wave: it might be 
impossible to point out exactly where one wave ends and the next 
begins, admittedly, but they are nevertheless separate in so far as we 
see a plurality of waves and not just one single wave. From the under-
lying perspective of the ocean — the enlightened non-dual experience 
— however, although the waves might in some sense be differentiated 
from each other, they are nevertheless unified in so far as they are part 
of one and the same ocean. They are, in other words, individual 
transient expressions of this single ocean — they quite literally share a 
common (aquatic) ground — and thus are not something substantially 
separate from it. The waves are thus one of the forms the ocean takes. 
Accordingly, one cannot intelligibly talk about where a wave ends and 
the ocean begins because their boundaries are continually shifting and 
indeterminate. This metaphor gives sense to enlightened experience as 
non-dual and all-embracing. Yet, it remains difficult to imagine what 
it is like to live and experience in this ocean-like way. The presenta-
tion above certainly does not exhaust the meaning or experience of 
non-dual experience, but is adequate for us to begin discussing how 
the phenomenological givens can possibly be reconciled with non-
dual experience. 
Almaas moves back and forth between the two perspectives of the 
phenomenological givens on the one hand, and pure consciousness on 
the other. One is easily confused about whether they are meant to be 
contradictory or complementary — and in the latter case, how that 
might even be possible. To set up the tension in its starkest possible 
form, we can ask: how can one hold the following two propositions 
simultaneously? 
You have your stream of experience, and I have mine. Your stream of 
experience might be of non-dual realization of satchitananda and mine 
might be of non-dual empty awareness, but obviously there are two, and 
they are different. (Almaas, p. 21) 
[T]here is no sense of being an individual consciousness. Rather than 
individuality, there is a sense of being the whole, or, more exactly, the 
sense of indeterminate boundaries. (ibid., p. 27) 
Almaas’s conclusion is not as clear as one might hope. He writes that: 
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[T]he minimal self, if taken to mean the simple fact or feeling of self 
recognition, can also be present in the non-dual experience of pure con-
sciousness, so prevalent in Advaita Vedānta. It can also be missing, at 
least some of the time, in deep Samadhi or absorption, this way 
allowing for the Buddhist no-self kind of realization. (ibid., p. 30) 
How can we understand a position in which the ‘minimal self, if taken 
to mean the simple fact or feeling of self recognition’ is sometimes 
present, but also sometimes missing? We suggest that the seeming 
incompatibility above can be resolved by introducing a distinction 
between the content of experience and the structure of the givenness 
of experience. 
The content and structure of the ‘givenness’ of experience 
In a personal correspondence, Almaas writes: 
What I wanted to use is the fact of first-personal givenness. It is a fact 
regardless of whether one is aware of it or not. The absence of mixing 
of two streams of experiences is a factual truth independent of the 
experience of the individuals. We know that an infant has its own 
stream of experiences, and hence first-personal givenness in this sense, 
even though the infant might not know that. 
According to Almaas, there is independently of the quality of any 
given experience a ‘factual truth’ of experience and this truth is 
nothing less than the phenomenological givens. In the context of non-
dual experience, we take this to mean that the quality or content of 
experience might be completely unified and without determinate 
boundaries, but that experience is always given within a structural, 
non-experiential framework of first-personal givenness such that each 
individual experiences that he has his own stream of potentially non-
dual experience. 
While it is not easy to grasp what an experience of pure conscious-
ness might be like for those of us who’ve not had it, we might appeal 
to some potentially analogous forms of experience to render these 
descriptions more accessible. We have all heard about the ‘absorbed, 
selfless’ artist, who, caught up in the flow of performance or inspira-
tion, loses herself in her work as she performs or creates it. Some 
phenomenological research has targeted this type of experience in 
classical musicians, for example, who claim to experience a blackout-
like trance with no perceptual or cognitive content, and indeed no self-
awareness while performing or practising (Høffding, 2014). Along the 
same lines, some jazz musicians claim, after a performance, that it 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 174 S.  HØFFDING  &  J.  KRUEGER 
wasn’t them who played, that they can’t play as well as the person 
who just performed (Bastian, 1987). We have to treat such claims with 
great care (see Høffding and Martiny, 2015) but we believe that they 
do point to a type of experiences unlike ordinary experiences, experi-
ences void of narrative self-structure. But are they also void of the 
phenomenological givens as Almaas defines them? In other words, are 
they completely (minimally) selfless? In a different context that prob-
ably connects musical absorption and non-dual experience, Evan 
Thompson writes about yoga and meditation studies and the experi-
ence of consciousness in dreamless sleep — an experience of absence 
of phenomenal content: 
‘Absence’ doesn’t mean absence of consciousness; it means absence of 
an object presented to consciousness… The traditional commentaries 
describe the absence experienced during sleep as a kind of ‘darkness’ 
that completely overwhelms and envelops consciousness… Yet dark-
ness is a visual quality with its own phenomenal presence. Similarly, in 
the ‘darkness’ of deep and dreamless sleep, there’s nothing to be cog-
nized or known, yet this absence itself is said to be subliminally experi-
enced as remembered upon awakening. So the absence is a felt absence, 
not a simple nonexistence. (Thompson, 2014, p. 238) 
Thompson’s claim is that even dreamless sleep has a minimal 
‘phenomenal presence’ or ‘a felt absence’ which is experientially 
retained after waking. The subject is not in doubt that it was he that 
was sleeping, just like the classical musician is not in doubt that it was 
he who underwent the ‘blackout-like’ experience. Thompson refers to 
Zahavi’s minimal self in his own work, but labels this experience as 
the ‘bare feeling of being alive’ (ibid., pp. 234–5). Even in this bare 
feeling of being alive, since one does not fail in self-ascription upon 
waking (from sleep or ‘blackout-like’ experience), a minimal, pre-
reflective first-person perspective is retained even in this experience. 
In other words, we are here dealing with a seemingly contentless kind 
of experience, in which there is no separation of subject and object, 
simply because no objects are given. Yet, the structure of this content-
less experience implicitly includes a first-person perspective. 
The potential phenomenological connections between these various 
kinds of purportedly non-dual experiences certainly need more argu-
ment to hold, but here we merely wanted to look to other kinds of 
experience that might help us grasp how an experience might, on one 
hand, have experiential content in which ‘all is one’ while, on the 
other, maintain a first-personal structure differentiating that experi-
ence from both its (non-dual) content as well as the experiences of 
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others. And to return to Almaas, then: on our interpretation, whenever 
he is talking about the phenomenological givens or the individual 
stream of consciousness, he is addressing a necessary structural 
dimension of consciousness, and when describing pure awareness or 
non-dual experience, this pertains to the quality or content given 
within that structure. Like the ‘infant’ who ‘has its own stream of 
experiences’ without being aware of it (personal correspondence), we 
need not be aware of the structural conditions of our experience; they 
do not figure as experientially given themselves. To put it in other 
words, the structure Almaas points to as the individual stream of con-
sciousness is very similar or even identical to what we have called 
ipseity of consciousness or plainly the minimal self. Drawing on 
Henry, Zahavi writes about the primitive pre-reflective structure in a 
way we think would resonate with Almaas: ‘When speaking of self-
affection one should simply bear in mind that we are dealing with a 
non-relational type of manifestation: at this level there is no subject–
object dichotomy, there is no difference between the dative and 
genitive of manifestation’ (Zahavi, 2005, p. 71). 
So where does all this leave us? Potentially, we have arrived at a 
position that allows non-dual experience to coexist alongside the 
phenomenological givens, such as the first-person perspective. This 
meeting and coexistence is exciting indeed, and ought to encourage 
more collaboration between phenomenology and spiritual work. 
Almaas, a spiritual master, successfully brings strong phenomeno-
logical thinking into his own tradition and shows such an integration 
to be of mutual benefit. On this conclusion, we want to suggest further 
avenues in which a collaboration could be developed. 
The meeting of academic and spiritual traditions as found in this 
special issue is not the first of its kind and can be seen as a con-
tinuation of Varela and colleagues’ work as found in The Embodied 
Mind (1991) and The View From Within (1999). The study of medi-
tation and other spiritual practices combined with phenomenology, 
philosophy of mind, and neuropsychology has emerged as a very 
powerful research programme, witnessed not only by numerous 
prestigious publications (Thompson, 2014; Siderits, Thompson and 
Zahavi, 2011; Flanagan, 2011; Albahari, 2006; Ganeri, 2012) but also 
in the swift rise of the practice of yoga, mindfulness, and different 
forms of mediation in the ‘West’ over the last decade. It is not 
unlikely that the authors of the target papers could contribute to the 
work already in progress in this promising interdisciplinary domain. 
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As part of this effort, it is crucial to clarify the explanandum in order 
to get a more robust grasp of the nature of the non-dual experiences in 
question. As academics without direct acquaintance with these experi-
ences ourselves, we believe that a fruitful approach would be to 
engage in comprehensive qualitative interviews with spiritual masters 
and other practitioners. There is precedence for such an approach 
combining various interview forms with phenomenology in the field 
of dance and athletics (Legrand and Ravn, 2009; Ravn and Hansen, 
2013), musicianship (Høffding, 2014; Høffding and Schiavio, 2015), 
psychopathology (Parnas et al., 2005), physical impairment (Martiny, 
2015), pristine experience (Hurlburt, 2011), and various requisite 
methodologies are under continual development (Vermersch, 2009; 
Petitmengin, 2006; Høffding and Martiny, 2015). If spiritual masters, 
such as those who have contributed to this special issue as well as 
other revered teachers from other traditions, would be willing to 
engage in direct, thorough interviews, this would be a valuable 
opportunity to delve even further into the experience of self and no-
self — a meeting from which both parties would undoubtedly benefit. 
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